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Abstract
When contracts are unobserved (and nonexclusive), agents can promise the same
asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. I show that a central mecha-
nism can extract all relevant information about contracts that agents enter by inducing
them to report one another. The mechanism sets position limits and reveals the names
of agents who hit the limits according to (voluntary) reports from their counterparties.
This holds even if sending reports is costly and agents can collude. In some cases, an
agent’s position limit must be nonbinding in equilibrium. The mechanism has some
features of a clearinghouse.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D02, D82, D86, G20, G28
1. Introduction
Consider a bank that buys a credit default swap from AIG. The bank knows that AIG
has enough capital to honor the swap agreement if the bank is its only client. However,
AIG might sell credit default swaps to many banks and thus create a liability that it cannot
honor should it need to make a payment. A central mechanism might help by monitoring
AIG’s and other agents’ positions so that no agent enters into too many liabilities relative to
his capital. Indeed, the recent ﬁnancial crisis has led banks and regulators to work toward
the establishment of a clearinghouse for credit default swaps.
If a central mechanism could observe all the contracts that agents enter, it could ensure
that agents don’t enter into too many contracts by setting position limits. However, observ-
ing every contract that an agent can enter may be too costly, as agents may attempt to hide
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1their transactions or make them too complicated to understand. It turns out that it might
be enough that the central mechanism observes only the contracts agents choose to report.
In particular, I show that by allowing agents to report the identities of their counterparties
and revealing the names of those who hit prespeciﬁed position limits, a central mechanism
can achieve the same outcome that would be achieved if agents could not enter into secret
contracts. This is true even if sending a report to the mechanism involves some small cost
and even if agents can collude. I also show that in some cases it is possible to prevent
collusion only if the mechanism allows each agent to enter more contracts than he actually
enters in equilibrium; that is, the position limit must be nonbinding in equilibrium.
The central mechanism can extract all relevant information about the contracts that
agents enter by inducing them to report one another. In particular, the optimal position
limit is such that if an agent enters a contract and reports it to the mechanism, his counter-
party has the incentive to pay what he promised, but if an agent enters a contract without
reporting it, his counterparty is induced to plan a strategic default in which he enters as
many contracts as he can with the intention to default on all of them. In equilibrium, every
agent can enter contracts until he hits the position limit, but the position limit is not suf-
ﬁciently high to make default proﬁtable; thus, every agent ends up with only one contract,
which is enough to achieve an eﬃcient allocation. However, if an agent enters a contract
without reporting it, he allows his counterparty to enter more contracts than the position
limit, and this increases the counterparty’s gain from a strategic default to the point at
which default is proﬁtable.
To induce reporting, the position limit cannot be too high, nor can it be too low. If
the position limit is too high, the counterparty will always default whether or not the agent
reports him; but then the two agents will not enter a contract to begin with. If the position
limit is too low, the counterparty will never default; but then the two agents will not report
to save the reporting fee. In some cases, “not too low” means that the position limit must
be higher than the number of contracts an agent enters in equilibrium.
To implement a position limit that is nonbinding in equilibrium, the mechanism must
not reveal the exact number of contracts that an agent has entered. It should only reveal
whether an agent has reached the position limit. The idea that the mechanism should not
reveal too much information is well known in multistage games with private information
and hidden actions: Too much information makes it easier for agents to manipulate the
mechanism.1 In my paper, an agent who learns that his counterparty has already entered
a contract believes that his counterparty plans a strategic default. Hence, the agent cannot
precommit to enter a contract with such a counterparty. But then the eﬀective position
limit is only one.
If agents cannot send reports to a central mechanism, they must put up cash as collateral.
Collateral acts like a position limit because an agent may not have enough cash to enter
the number of contracts needed to make default proﬁtable. However, using collateral has
an opportunity cost, as agents forgo investing in their positive net present value (NPV)
projects. Since agents can divert money from investment to consumption, the optimal
mechanism with reports (i.e., the position limit mechanism) may also require collateral, but
less than the amount needed when agents cannot send reports.
Empirical predictions. According to the model, the gain from allowing agents to send
reports to a central mechanism increases when the ﬁxed cost per trade falls and/or the
1See Myerson (1986), Bester and Strausz (2000, 2001, 2007), and the discussion in Subsection 4.4.
2probability of ﬁnding a trading counterparty rises — both are features of a more liquid
market.2 The model also provides closed-form solutions and some comparative statics for
the optimal amount of collateral (with and without reporting), the amount of investment,
and the optimal position limits.
While this paper does not attempt to model any particular intermediary, the optimal
mechanism has some features of a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse may be part of a fu-
tures exchange or a stand-alone institution; it can clear exchange-traded contracts as well as
over-the-counter products.3 Clearinghouses deploy a number of safeguards to protect their
members and customers against the consequences of default by a clearinghouse participant.
In addition to requiring collateral, the clearinghouse monitors and controls the positions of
its members (at least daily) and the ﬁnancial statements, internal controls, and other indi-
cators of ﬁnancial strength (periodically). Some clearinghouses (e.g., in Sydney and Hong
Kong) also set capital-based position limits.4 These safeguards, which reduce the amount
of collateral that clearinghouse members must post, are more eﬀective when clearinghouse
members do not enter contracts secretly.5 In practice, the incentive to default may depend
on activities in more than one market. Indeed, clearinghouses have recently moved toward
more central clearing.6
Bernanke (1990) distinguishes between two roles of a clearinghouse: reducing the trans-
actions cost of consummating agreed-upon trades (analogous to a bank that clears checks),
and standardizing contracts by setting terms and format and by guaranteeing performance
to both sides of trade (analogous to an insurance company).7 The optimal mechanism in
my paper has a more minimal role, but the results remain even if we add other roles, such as
guaranteeing performance. In addition, the model does not rule out multiple intermediaries.
Although this is not a model of regulation, in one interpretation the mechanism can be
interpreted as a regulator (e.g., a central bank). My theory suggests that, in some cases, to
induce banks to report all their transactions voluntarily, the regulator may need to commit
to keep these reports private.8 The theory also illustrates a connection between regulation
and private-sector incentives to discipline. The regulator, who sets position limits, relies
on ﬁrms in the private sector to discipline one another; that is, each ﬁrm makes sure that
its trading partner reports the trade to the regulator. The theory implies that regulations
2This seems consistent with the observation that the London Clearing House started clearing over-the-
counter interest rate swaps only after they became a standardized and liquid product. Central clearing for
credit default swaps also became relevant after a tremendous growth in market size (and the bad consequences
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis).
3For example, the London Clearing House clears over-the-counter interest rate swaps without being
involved in the matching and bargaining processes.
4Capital-based position limits, whose purpose is to make sure that members maintain positions within
their ﬁnancial capability, are diﬀerent from speculative position limits. The latter are set by exchanges and
regulators to prevent speculators from manipulating spot prices.
5Netting may also reduce collateral. However, some clearinghouses (e.g., the Hong Kong Futures Ex-
change Clearing Corporation) calculate margin on a gross basis rather than a net basis. Also, while marking
to market reduces the risk of default, when a counterparty’s position is closed, there is a risk of not ﬁnding
a new counterparty and remaining unhedged.
6For example, in 2004, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) fully integrated the clearing of all trades
of the Chicago Board of Trade in addition to those of the CME. The CME has also developed cross-margin
arrangements with other clearinghouses so that margins can be calculated based on the total position.
7See also Telser and Higinbotham (1977) and Edwards (1983).
8While my model provides a novel rationale for regulatory secrecy, I do not present a full discussion of
the costs and beneﬁts of regulatory secrecy.
3that are too stringent may be counterproductive because they undermine private-sector
incentives for agents to discipline one another.
Related literature. The paper contributes to the literature on ﬁnancial intermediation by
illustrating a very minimal role of an intermediary. The intermediary in my paper provides
ac o s t - e ﬀective way to monitor agents’ positions, not only because it saves on the cost of
duplicate monitoring, but also because it relies on voluntary reports. Existing literature has
focused on problems that arise because of asymmetric information regarding cash ﬂows and
on the role of intermediaries in enhancing liquidity. In contrast, I start with markets that
are already liquid and show how an intermediary can help.9 The main problem in my paper
is that an agent’s history of transactions is private information. Unlike Diamond (1984), I
do not rely on diversiﬁcation, and unlike in Townsend (1978), the intermediary arises when
the ﬁxed cost per trade is low rather than high.10
The idea that a mechanism can extract information by inducing agents to report one
another is related to the literature on information extraction in teams (e.g., Ma, 1988). This
literature shows that when a principal interacts with many agents, he can implement his
desired outcome if agents observe each other’s choice of eﬀort.11 An agent is induced to take
the desired amount of eﬀort for fear of being reported to the principal by a teammate; how-
ever, as pointed out by many (e.g., Itoh, 1993; Bisin and Guaitoli, 2010), these information
extraction mechanisms may not work when agents can enter side contracts. In my paper a
mechanism can extract all relevant information about agents’ positions by inducing agents
to report the contracts they enter, including their counterparties’ identities. An agent is
induced to report because otherwise his counterparty can enter more contracts than the
position limit, which leads to a strategic default. Crucially, the mechanism in my paper is
collusion proof, and agents cannot undo the mechanism by entering side agreements.
In a diﬀerent framework, Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Parlour and Rajan (2001)
study the eﬀect of nonexclusivity on equilibrium interest rates and competition in credit
markets.12 In Bizer and DeMarzo, contracts entered in the past are observable and have
priority. Thus, a reporting mechanism, as in my paper, cannot improve welfare.13 In Parlour
and Rajan, intermediaries oﬀer contracts simultaneously, and then a single borrower can
accept any subset of these contracts. As in my paper, agents who strategically default do
so on all the contracts they entered. In their model, this can rule out entry even though
competing lenders make positive proﬁt s .I nm yp a p e r ,t h i sh e l p st os u s t a i na ne q u i l i b r i u m
in which agents do not enter contracts secretly.
Paper outline. In Section 2, I present the economic environment, and in Section 3, I
9Since my paper illustrates a negative aspect of liquidity, it relates to Myers and Rajan (1998). In their
model, greater asset liquidity reduces a ﬁrm’s capacity to raise external ﬁnance because it reduces the ﬁrm’s
a b i l i t yt oc o m m i tt oas p e c i ﬁcc o u r s eo fa c t i o n .
10Madhavan (2000) summarizes the extensive literature on the eﬀects of diﬀerent trading mechanisms on
liquidity provision. Gorton and Winton (2003) summarize the extensive literature on the role of banks.
Many other papers focus on the role of an intermediary. For example, Brusco and Jackson (1999) show how
a market maker can economize on the ﬁxed costs of trading across periods; and Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987) show how middlemen can reduce search costs.
11See also Ma et al (1988), in which agents observe correlated state variables before they take actions.
12See also Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), who study insurance contracts; Bisin and Rampini (2006), who
study bankruptcy; and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), who show that intermediaries can make positive proﬁts
by oﬀering contracts that are not traded in equilibrium.
13The problem in their paper is that additional contracts impose a negative externality on existing con-
tracts because the agent’s hidden eﬀort aﬀects his future income.
4solve for the optimal contract when contracts are exclusive (second best). Section 4 solves
for an optimal mechanism when contracts are nonexclusive and shows that the second best
outcome can be achieved; this is the paper’s main result. I also discuss the role of nonbinding
position limits and show that, in general, the mechanism should not reveal the information
it has. In section 5, I show that the ability to send reports to the central mechanism is
crucial and I solve for the best outcome that can be achieved when agents cannot send
reports (third best). Section 6 discusses some robustness issues, and Section 7 concludes.
The appendix contains proofs and omitted details.
2. The Model
The model has a continuum of agents who enter bilateral contracts for mutual insurance
purpose. Half of the agents are type 1 and half are type 2. Each contract is between
a type-1 agent and a type-2 agent. Contracts are entered at date 0, and they specify
payments at date 1 contingent on the realized state. An agent can default strategically,
but if he defaults, he loses his future income. I ﬁrst solve the case in which agents can
precommit to enter exclusive contracts (second best) and show that to achieve an eﬃcient
allocation, it is suﬃcient that each agent enters only one contract. Then I solve for an
optimal mechanism when contracts are assumed to be nonexclusive and agents cannot
observe the set of contracts their counterparties have entered or will enter.
In more detail: There are three dates,  =0 12, and one divisible good, called dollars,
or simply cash. Uncertainty is modeled by assuming two states of nature, state 1 and state
2, one of which is realized at date 1. Agents are risk-neutral and obtain an expected utility
of (0 + 1 + 2) from consuming 0 1,a n d2 dollars at dates 01 and 2 respectively.
Agents are protected by limited liability, so  ≥ 0 at each date.
At date 0, each agent has one dollar and an investment opportunity (project) that re-
quires his human capital. Each project lasts for two periods and yields nothing if transferred
to another agent; thus, a bank cannot invest on behalf of agents, as in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). Projects’ cash ﬂows are in Figure 1. Start with the project of a type-1 agent. The
agent invests 1 ∈ [01] at date 0. At date 1, the project yields 1 in state 1 (0) but
requires an additional investment 1 in state 2. The additional investment must be made
in full for the project to continue to date 2 and is called a negative cash ﬂow. If the project
continues to maturity (because it had a positive cash ﬂow at date 1 or it had a negative
cash ﬂow and the additional investment was made in full), the project yields 1 dollars at
date 2. Similarly, the project of a type-2 agent yields 2 in state 2 but requires 2 in state
1. If the project continues to maturity, it yields 2 dollars at date 2. Note that there is
no aggregate uncertainty at date 1: Half of the projects have positive cash ﬂows and half
have negative cash ﬂows. Liquidation values are zero at every date, consistent with the
assumption that projects require human capital.
The risk-free rate is normalized to be zero percent (i.e., there is a storage technology
that gives one dollar at date  +1for every dollar invested at date ), and it is assumed
that 1  . The assumption implies that it is eﬃcient to make the additional
investment at date 1 if cash is available, and 1 implies that in a world without frictions,
each project has a positive NPV; the NPV of 0 project is (−1). The assumption 1
ensures that entering bilateral contracts is preferred to autarky despite the moral hazard
problems below (see Section 3).
5Contracts can be contingent on the state that is realized at date 1. However, agents
c a n n o tc o m m i tt om a k ep a y m e n t s :
Assumption 1. A na g e n tc a n n o tc o m m i tt op a yo u to ft h ep r o j e c t ’ sﬁnal cash ﬂows
().
Assumption 2. An agent cannot commit to pay out of the project’s interim cash ﬂows
().
Assumption 1 implies that an agent with a negative cash ﬂow cannot borrow at date 1
against the future cash ﬂows from his project. This is why agents enter insurance contracts
at date 0, such that an agent with a positive cash ﬂow transfers cash to an agent with a
negative cash ﬂow. Assumption 2 implies that agents may default on these contracts. Both
assumptions can be motivated by assuming that cash ﬂows are not veriﬁable in court. The
ﬁrst assumption can also be motivated by assuming moral hazard as in Holmström and
Tirole (1998), or by assuming that ﬁnal cash ﬂows are unobservable.
Enforcement technology. If an agent defaults (i.e., does not pay what he promised in full),
his project is terminated. In this case the agent keeps current cash ﬂows but loses future
cash ﬂows. It is optimal to terminate the project of a defaulting agent with probability
one, even if it is possible to choose a probability less than one, and it is assumed that it
is possible to commit to this closure policy. Allowing for additional penalties for default,
such as spending time in prison, losing one’s reputation, or losing other sources of future
income, does not alter the nature of the results. What’s important is that penalties impose
a ﬁnite cost, rather than an inﬁnite cost.
Collateral. Agents cannot post the projects’ assets as collateral, but they can post cash
as collateral. Speciﬁcally, a pair of agents can open an escrow account; they can store cash
through a third party who can commit not to divert it. Money placed in escrow is observable
to both agents and can be contracted upon. However, it is unobservable to agents who are
not part of the bilateral contract (or to the central planner). That is, agents can open secret
escrow accounts.
The last assumption in the benchmark model is that at date 0 agents can divert cash
invested in their projects.
Assumption 3. The amount that an agent invests in his project () and the amount
that an agent consumes are private information.
Assumption 3 introduces the risk of strategic default via “asset substitution”: An agent
can consume his initial endowment, instead of investing it, and subsequently default at
date 1, as he has no cash ﬂows to pay from. Think of it as an agent diverting cash from
one project (the original project) to another project (“consumption”) that yields some
unobservable cash ﬂow at date 0 and nothing afterward. Assumption 3 is the reason agents
may need to post collateral, even in the benchmark case in which contracts are exclusive
(see Section 3).14 Note that while everyone can observe whether a project operates (it can
be terminated upon default), the level of investment () is private information. In addition,
a project can operate even if  =0 . For example, an agent can go to work and keep his
business open but eﬀectively do nothing (e.g., Bernie Madoﬀ).
Trading game. Agents can enter contracts, as described below. The game captures the
idea that a counterparty may have entered contracts in the past and may enter additional
14Assumption 3 is needed because without it one could infer how many contracts an agent has entered by
observing , the amount left for investment after posting collateral on all contracts. If posting collateral
did not reduce the amount available for investment, Assumption 3 would not be necessary.
6contracts in the future, with none of these contracts being observable. The game also
captures the idea of a large market in which a deviation by one agent (or a ﬁnite number
of agents) does not aﬀect bargaining power and contract terms. I do not focus on search
frictions.15
There are  trading rounds; all happen at date 0 before agents post collateral, invest
in their projects, and/or consume (see Figure 2). In each trading round, a fraction 1
 of
agents, chosen randomly, arrive to trade for the ﬁrst time, with an equal mass of both
types. Agents who are present in each trading round are pairwise matched according to
their types, and each pair can enter a contract. Then each agent decides whether to enter
additional contracts or stick with the contracts he has entered so far. An agent who wants
to enter additional contracts stays for the next trading round to be matched with another
counterparty. If there are no more trading rounds, the agent leaves the trading game and
moves to the next stage, in which he posts collateral. An agent who does not want to enter
additional contracts also leaves the trading game.16
The sequence of events for an individual agent is in Figure 3. For simplicity, I assume
that the contract is set by a planner and that it is entered only if both agents agree to enter
(they choose whether to enter simultaneously). The results remain even if a pair of agents
can enter a contract that is diﬀerent from the one suggested by the planner (Subsection
6.1), and even if we assume other bargaining processes (e.g., one agent makes an oﬀer and
the other agent can either accept or reject it).
The main assumption is as follows:
Assumption 4. An agent cannot observe contracts that other pairs of agents enter
(either in the past or in the future).
Assumption 4 has a few interpretations: Agents can enter contracts secretly17; trading
is too fast for agents to keep track of a counterparty’s history of transactions; or existing
contracts are observable but not understood. An example is the complex derivative positions
and oﬀ-balance-sheet transactions made by many hedge funds. As noted earlier, an agent
cannot observe the amount of collateral that his counterparty posts with other agents;
an agent who enters nonexclusive contracts opens a diﬀerent escrow account with each
counterparty.
Finally, the assumption that agents have the same initial endowment is made for sim-
plicity. The results extend to the case in which agents have diﬀerent endowments, which
are private information (see Subsection 6.2).
15The eﬀects of search and bargaining frictions on valuation and bid-ask spreads in over-the-counter
markets are analyzed in Duﬃe et al. (2005, 2007).
16In equilibrium, collateral requirements and/or position limits put an upper bound on the number of
contracts that an agent can enter. Thus, the mass of agents present in each round is ﬁnite, even if a
continuum of agents decides to deviate by staying for more than one round. In addition, each type has the
same proportion. In the out-of-equilibrium event in which the mass of type-1 agents does not equal the mass
of type-2 agents, some agents remain unmatched.
17F o re x a m p l e ,a c c o r d i n gt ot h eWall Street Journal (August 25, 2005), “(hedge) funds sometimes move
out of trades – ‘assign’ them – without telling the bank that sold them the credit-derivative contract that
their counterparty has changed.” Another example is the Nigerian barge deal between Enron and Merrill
Lynch in which Enron allegedly arranged for Merrill Lynch to serve as a temporary buyer (of the barges) so
as to make Enron appear more proﬁtable than it was. According to a release by the Department of Justice
(October 15, 2003), “Enron promised in a secret oral ‘handshake’ side-deal that Merrill Lynch would receive
a return on its investment plus an agreed-upon proﬁt...”
73. The Benchmark of Exclusive Contracts (Second Best)
In this section, I analyze the benchmark case in which every agent can enter at most one
contract (i.e.,  =1 ). I characterize optimal contracts as a solution to a planning problem
in which the planner sets a contract and recommends to each agent how much to invest.
A contract is a pair ( )=12,w h e r e is the amount of cash that an agent of type
 p o s t sa sc o l l a t e r a l ,a n d is the amount of cash that he transfers to the other agent at
date 1; an agent with a positive cash ﬂow transfers cash to an agent with a negative cash
ﬂow (i.e., an agent of type  promises to pay in state ). An agent can default only on the
amount  −  ( ≤ ). Assuming that there are no cash transfers at date 2 and that all
transfers at date 0 are in the form of collateral is without loss of generality.
The triple (  )=12, which includes the contract and the planner’s recommended
level of investment, is referred to as the agreement and is denoted by .A n a g r e e m e n t
induces the following consumption stream. At date 0,a na g e n to ft y p e consumes 1−−,
which is his initial endowment minus the amounts he invests and posts as collateral (without
loss of generality, agents do not store on their own). The agent’s consumption at date 1
depends on the state. In state , the agent consumes  +  − , which is the amount
left after paying what he promised using the collateral he posted and the project’s cash
ﬂows. In the other state, denoted by −, the agent consumes  + − − ,w h i c hi st h e
amount left after making the additional investment using the collateral he posted and the
payment received from his counterparty. (We can assume, without loss of generality, that
the agreement is such that each agent has enough cash to make the additional investment.)
At date 2, the agent consumes . The agent’s expected utility is
() ≡ 1 −  −  +
1
2
( +  − )+
1
2
( + − − )+ (1)




When an agreement is symmetric, I sometimes drop the index .T h ea g r e e m e n ti sfeasible
if: (i)  ≥ 0;( i i ) ≥  ≥ 0; and (iii) the amount that every agent consumes at each date
and state is nonnegative. That is,
1 −  −  ≥ 0,f o r  ∈ {12},( 2 )
 +  −  ≥ 0,f o r  ∈ {12},( 3 )
 + − −  ≥ 0,f o r  ∈ {12}.( 4 )
Since the two types of agents are identical ex-ante and have equal proportion, it is natural
to assume that the planner’s objective is to maximize the unweighted sum of agents’ utilities,
1()+2(). This is equivalent to maximizing 1+2. The solution to the unconstrained
problem (ﬁrst best) is 1 = 2 =1 , 1 = 2 =0 ,a n d1 = 2 = .I nt h eﬁrst best, agents
do not post collateral, and the utility for each agent is .
In the second best, we need to ensure that (i) agents have the incentives to invest and
make the transfers suggested by the planner (incentive compatibility); and (ii) each agent
prefers the proposed agreement to autarky (participation).
Participation. Denote by  an agent’s utility in autarky. The participation constraint
is
() ≥ ,f o r  ∈ {12}.( 5 )
8In autarky, an agent can self-insure by investing  and storing  =1− so that  = .
In this case, the agent continues his project in both states and obtains  +  = +
1+
( = 1
1+). Alternatively, the agent can invest  =1and store nothing. In this case, the
agent cannot continue his project when he realizes a negative shock, and his expected utility
is +
2 .S i n c e1, self-insuring is preferred. Thus,  = +
1+ . Entering bilateral contracts
is preferred to autarky because a pair of agents can allocate all the cash stored to the agent
with the negative cash ﬂow so that each agent can invest more and store less.18
Incentives to make payments. Suppose an agent has entered the contract () and
invested 0.W h e n  + 0  , the agent does not have enough cash to deliver the full
amount, and it is optimal for him to pay nothing because if he makes a partial payment
he still loses his project. When  + 0 ≥ , the agent can pay the full amount, and it
is optimal for him to do so because otherwise he gains  −  ≤ 0 but loses 0   0.
Denote by  whether an agent delivers ( =1 )or not ( =0 ) . The optimal delivery rule is
(0)=1 ,i f + 0 ≥ ,a n d(0)=0 ,o t h e r w i s e .
Incentives to invest. Denote by (0
|) the utility for an agent of type , if he deviates
from the agreement  by investing 0
 ∈ [01−] instead of .D e n o t eb y(0
) whether
the agent has enough cash to make the additional investment; that is, (0
)=1 ,i f +
− ≥ 0
,a n d(0
)=0 ,o t h e r w i s e .T h e n
(0













[ + − + (0
)( − )0
].
The ﬁrst line in (6) is the amount the agent consumes at date 0, the second is the amount
he consumes at dates 1 and 2 after a positive cash ﬂow, and the third line is the amount
consumed after a negative cash ﬂow. Observe that (|)=().
The incentive constraint is that for  ∈ {12},
(|) ≥ (0
|), for every 0
 ∈ [01 − ] (7)
The second-best problem is to ﬁnd a feasible agreement that maximizes 1 + 2 subject to
the participation constraint and the incentive constraint.
Equation (7) can be replaced with (|) ≥ (0|). In other words, it is enough
to focus on deviations in which an agent invests nothing in his project and then defaults
when he needs to make a payment. Intuitively, an agent who plans to default is better oﬀ
consuming his initial endowment, rather than investing it and losing it upon default.19
Hence, the incentive constraint reduces to
1
2
( − ) ≤ ( − 1),f o r  ∈ {12}.( 8 )
Intuitively, the expected gain from not delivering the promised amount (left-hand side) must
be less than or equal to the expected loss from not investing in one’s project (right-hand
side).
18In other words, the symmetric agreement () that satisﬁes  =2 ,a n d =  =1− ,i ss t r i c t l y
preferred to autarky.
19L e m m a1i nt h ea p p e n d i xc o n t a i n sap r o o f .
9The problem reduces to ﬁnding a feasible agreement that maximizes 1 + 2 subject to
Equations (5) and (8). This is a linear programming problem. When  ≥ 1+1
2,t h e
ﬁrst-best agreement satisﬁes all the constraints and is a unique solution. In this case, the
incentive constraint is not binding. In contrast, when 1+1
2, the incentive constraint
binds and the optimal agreement is such that: agents do not consume at date 0; each agent
has exactly what he needs to make the additional investment but not more; and each agent
is indiﬀerent between following the agreement and planning a strategic default. Collateral
is needed to prevent a strategic default in which an agent consumes his initial endowment
instead of investing it.
Proposition 1. (Second best) If  ≥ 1+1
2, the second-best agreement equals the ﬁrst
best. Otherwise, the second-best agreement is given (uniquely) by 1 = 2 = , 1 = 2 =
 − (1 + ),a n d1 = 2 =1− ,w h e r e =
−2(−1)
−2(−1)+2.
Denote the second-best agreement by  ≡ (  ).T h e n()=−(−1)
(from Equation (1) and Proposition 1). The ﬁrst term () is the agent’s ﬁrst-best utility,
and the second term is the opportunity cost of collateral: By posting collateral, agents forgo
investing in their positive NPV projects.
The optimal amount of collateral decreases in  but increases in .A n i n c r e a s e i n 
reduces the gain from a strategic default because the agent has more to lose. In contrast, an
increase in  increases the gain because the liquidity need is higher and the agent defaults
on a larger amount.
4. Optimal Contracts with Nonexclusivity
In this section – which contains the main results – I analyze the case in which agents
cannot precommit to enter exclusive contracts. For ease of exposition, I focus on the limit
case in which there is an inﬁnite number of trading rounds ( = ∞). Thus, an agent
assigns a probability of zero to the event that he or his counterparty will not be able to
enter additional contracts should either of them decide to do so. The nature of the results
remains even if  is ﬁnite.20
4.1 The mechanism design problem
Using a mechanism design approach, I extend the trading game from Section 2 by allow-
ing agents to communicate with a central planner, who designs the rules of communication
to maximize the sum of agents’ utilities.
Agents here have both private information (e.g., the identities of their counterparties)
and private actions (e.g., whether to stay for additional trading rounds). By the revelation
principle (Myerson, 1982, 1986), we can restrict attention to direct communication mecha-
nisms that are incentive compatible. A direct mechanism means that in each stage of the
game every agent reports his new private information to the planner, and in return, the
planner recommends an action to him, using some prespeciﬁed recommendation rule that
maps reports to recommendations. Incentive compatibility means that it is optimal for
20In particular, we can assume that  is a random variable with a geometric distribution. More details
are available upon request.
10each agent to be truthful and obedient (follow the planner’s recommendation), given that
all other agents are.
Hence, the sequence of events in each trading round is as follows:
1. Every agent who is present in the trading round reports the identity of his counterparty
to the planner (an agent can lie).
2. The planner tells every agent whether to agree to enter a contract, and every agent
chooses whether to follow this recommendation. A contract is entered only if both
the agent and his counterparty agree to enter.
3. Every agent tells the planner whether he has entered a contract in the current round
( a na g e n tc a nl i e ) .
4. The planner tells every agent whether to leave or stay for the next round, and every
agent chooses whether to follow this recommendation.
The problem reduces to ﬁnding a contract and a recommendation rule that maximize
the sum of agents’ utilities subject to incentive compatibility.
Our main result is that the direct mechanism above can implement the second best. The
result holds under the standard assumptions of the revelation principle, but it continues to
hold even if we violate two assumptions. In particular, I assume that sending a report to
the planner involves some small cost and that agents can collude.
In my setting, it is natural to focus on collusion between a pair of agents who were
matched, but the results extend to a group of more than two agents. Collusion is modeled
by assuming that a side planner can recommend to a pair of agents what to do. The
implementation is collusion proof if the side planner cannot come up with a recommendation
that increases the sum of the two agents’ utilities, such that it is optimal for each of them
to follow the recommendation if the other agent does and if all other agents are truthful
and obedient to the central planner.21
For ease of exposition, I assume that the cost of sending a report to the planner ap-
proaches zero and exclude it from the expressions below. I also assume, for simplicity, that
the planner can observe the identity of agents who send reports; this assumption can be re-
laxed without aﬀecting the results. Finally, assume that an agent agrees to enter a contract
only if he believes that there is a positive probability that his counterparty will also agree.
This can be motivated by assuming there is some small cost involved in making an oﬀer.22
4.2 The main result
Suppose the planner sets the second-best contract. The planner wants to implement an
outcome in which every agent enters exactly one contract and follows it. The utility for
each agent is then ().
A possible deviation is that an agent enters more than one contract, invests nothing in
his project, and subsequently defaults on all contracts. The maximum number of contracts
21The side planner is a modeling device that captures what a pair of agents can achieve via direct com-
munication in an environment of asymmetric information; see, for example, Laﬀont and Martimort (1997).
The side planner knows that the two agents were matched with one another, but he cannot observe anything
else about the history of the game.
22The last assumption is used in the proof of Proposition 4.
11that a deviating agent can enter depends on the recommendation rule used by the planner
and on the equilibrium strategies of all other agents. Suppose that if all other agents are
truthful and obedient, a deviating agent can enter  contracts (assume the deviating agent
remains truthful). I refer to  as the position limit. The deviating agent’s utility is then











The ﬁrst expression (1−) is what the agent consumes at date 0 after posting collateral.
The other two expressions represent the expected amount consumed at date 1. In one
state, the agent receives back all the collateral he posted plus a payment from each of his
counterparties. In the other state, the agent needs to deliver, but he defaults; thus, he
loses his collateral and ends up with nothing (limited liability). Observe that () is
increasing in .
To prevent the deviation above, we must have:
() ≤ ().( 1 0 )
Denote ∗ = bmax(1
2(−1)
 )c, where the function bc denotes the largest integer less than
or equal to . Equation (10) reduces to  ≤ ∗.
Another deviation is that a pair of agents enters a contract secretly. Speciﬁcally, a
side planner can recommend that the two agents enter a contract without reporting each
other’s identities and without reporting the fact that they entered a contract; he can further
recommend that the two agents do not enter additional contracts afterward. If both agents
follow the side planner’s recommendations, each of them obtains the second-best utility
without incurring the reporting cost.
For the implementation to be collusion proof, we need to make sure that if one agent
follows the side planner’s recommendation, it is optimal for the other agent to cheat. An
agent can cheat by entering additional contracts and defaulting on all contracts. Since the
planner does not observe that the two agents entered a contract, he continues to allow each
of them to enter  additional contracts, according to the position limit. Hence, together
with the contract that was entered secretly, each of the two agents can enter a total of +1
contracts. Thus, an agent will cheat if and only if
(+1 )().( 1 1 )
Equation (11) reduces to  ≥ ∗.
Combining the two results above, we obtain that  = ∗.
Proposition 2. (Optimal position limits) To implement the second best in a collusion-
proof way, the planner must allow each agent to enter ∗ contracts, i.e., he must set a
position limit  = ∗.
Intuitively, the position limit cannot be too high nor can it be too low. If the position
limit is too high, agents are induced to enter too many contracts with the intention to
default on all of them; if the position limit is too low, agents can collude by entering
a contact without reporting it to the planner. Agents have the incentive to report one
12another only if not reporting triggers a counterparty’s default. When a contract is not
reported, a counterparty can enter more contracts than the position limit. However, if the
position limit is too low, a counterparty will never ﬁnd it optimal to do so, whether the
contract is reported to the planner or not. In this case, a pair of agents can beneﬁtb yn o t
reporting and saving the reporting cost.
Implementation. Denote by () the number of times that agent  (here  denotes an
agent’s identity) reported entering a contract by the end of round , and denote by 0()
the number of agents who reported entering a contract with agent  (an agent reported
entering a contract with agent  if he reported agent ’s identity and then reported entering
a contract).
Consider the following rule, which we call a position limit rule: If agent  reports the
identity of agent  in round , the planner recommends that agent  agree to enter a
contract if and only if 0()  ∗. The planner recommends that agent  leave if and only
if ()=0()=1or 0()=∗ (i.e., if the agent entered a contract and both the
agent and his counterparty reported it, or if the agent has hit the position limit).
One can show that the game induced by the recommendation rule above has a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which every agent enters the second-best contract exactly once. In
addition, the implementation is collusion proof.
Proposition 3. (Main Result) A position limit rule with a position limit ∗can imple-
ment the second best. In addition, the implementation is collusion proof.
Under a position limit rule, the planner sets a position limit ∗ and counts the number
of times that an agent has entered a contract, according to reports from his counterparties.
The planner recommends that an agent enter a contract only if his counterparty has not
hit the position limit. Thus, if everyone is truthful and obedient, a deviating agent can
enter at most ∗ contracts. Along the equilibrium path (when everyone is truthful), the
planner recommends that an agent leave after he enters his ﬁrst contract. From our previous
analysis, we know that it is optimal to follow this recommendation and that a pair of agents
cannot gain by entering a contract secretly. If an agent reports entering a contract, and
his counterparty does not, the planner does not count the contract and recommends that
the agent who reported should default. This rules out a unilateral deviation in which one
agent reports and his counterparty does not. Lying to the planner has the same eﬀect as
not reporting and is therefore suboptimal.
Essentially, the planner can extract all the relevant information about contracts that
agents enter by inducing them to “police” one another: If one agents does not report entering
a contract (and/or the identity of his counterparty), the counterparty is induced to plan
a strategic default. Note that the planner can extract information that is shared by two
agents (e.g., the fact that they entered a contract), but he cannot extract information that
is held by only one agent (e.g., the amount that an agent invests).
As I mentioned in the introduction, the idea that agents police one another relates to
the literature on information extraction in teams. However, in contrast to this literature,
the planner in my setting can extract all relevant information even when agents can collude.
The reason is that in my setting, a pair of agents cannot extract surplus from other agents,
because when an agent defaults, he defaults on all the contracts he entered. In contrast, in
the problem of a principal who deals with multiple agents, a group of agents can extract
surplus from the principal by putting low eﬀort and reporting high eﬀort. Hence, whenever
13the principal oﬀers contracts that induce high eﬀort, agents have the incentive to undo what
the principal does by entering a side contract.
The optimal position limit, ∗,i n c r e a s e si n but decreases in . Intuitively, when the
gain from strategic default falls (rises), the optimal position limit is higher (lower). It can
also be shown that the optimal position limit is lower when markets become more liquid,
as deﬁned in Section 5 below.
4.3 The role of nonbinding position limits
When 1+, it follows that ∗  1. Thus, the planner must allow each agent
to enter more than one contract, even though in equilibrium every agent enters only one
contract.
Corollary 1. If 1+, the position limit in Propositions 2 and 3 must be nonbinding
in equilibrium.
Position limits that are nonbinding in equilibrium are essential if agents can collude, but
they are not essential if agents cannot collude. When agents cannot collude, the planner can
implement the second best by allowing each agent to enter only one contract and punishing
an agent who lied or did not send a report to the planner by allowing his counterparty –
and only his counterparty – to enter ∗ additional contracts so that the counterparty will
have the incentive to default.23
In contrast, when agents can collude, the planner must rely on nonbinding position limits
to induce agents to punish one another. Since the planner cannot detect a joint deviation,
he must give each agent enough latitude to cheat on his counterparty. Then if a pair of
agents attempts to enter a contract without reporting it to the planner, it is optimal for
each of them to enter additional contracts and default.
The planner’s commitment to use the prespeciﬁed recommendation rule (which is one
of the assumptions behind the revelation principle) is crucial. When ∗  1, the planner
must allow an agent to enter ∗ contracts, although an agent will enter these contracts only
if he plans a strategic default. Ex ante, the threat of default is optimal because it induces
agents to reveal information to the planner. However, ex post, once an agent attempts to
enter more than one contract, it is suboptimal to let him do so.
4.4 How much information should the planner reveal?
In the implementation above, an agent can infer from the planner’s recommendations
whether his counterparty has reached the position limit and whether his counterparty re-
ported him. Instead of recommending an action, the planner can simply reveal this in-
formation. For example, at the beginning of each round, the planner can make a public
announcement (available at no cost to agents in the given round) of the identities of agents
who have reached the position limit, and after an agent reports entering a contract (and
the identity of his counterparty), the planner can let him know conﬁdentially whether his
counterparty reported him.
23Alternatively, a pair of agents can include a clause that voids a contract if the planner does not certify
that both agents reported entering it.
14Is it possible to implement the second best if the planner reveals more information?
Under some restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the answer is no. In other words,
the assumption that reports are conﬁdential (which is one of the assumptions behind the
revelation principle) is crucial, and the planner cannot be replaced by a “bulletin board.”
The restriction used in the proposition below is that an agent who learns that his
counterparty was reported entering a contract believes that his counterparty indeed entered
a contract. This holds if agents assign a zero probability to the event that other agents
have lied to the planner; for example, if an agent who reports entering a contract sends a
copy of the signed contract.24
Proposition 4. The planner must not reveal the exact number of times that a counterparty
was reported entering a contract. The planner should only reveal whether the counterparty
has reached the position limit or not.
The logic behind Proposition 4 is as follows: Unlike the planner, who can precommit to
use the prespeciﬁed recommendation rule, agents cannot precommit to take actions that are
optimal ex ante but are suboptimal ex post. An agent who believes that his counterparty
has already entered a contract, or more than one contract, will not agree to enter another
contract with him, since he will expect that his counterparty will continue to enter contracts
afterward and default on all contracts. However, to implement the second best, an agent
must be able to ﬁnd counterparties to enter contracts with until he hits the position limit.
The result relates to Bester and Strausz (2007), who study principal-agent problems
when the principal cannot precommit to take prespeciﬁed actions. They show that, without
loss of generality, the principal can restrict himself to communication devices such that the
agent reports his type honestly to the device, and the device garbles this information when
sending a message to the principal. The purpose of this noisy device is to “ﬁne tune” the
amount of information that the principal has.25
More generally, we know from the revelation principle for multistage games with adverse
selection and moral hazard (Myerson, 1986) that we can focus, without loss of generality,
on communication mechanisms in which the planner tells agents what to do without giving
them extra pieces of information. This is because more information makes it easier for agents
to manipulate the planner by lying to him or by disobeying his recommendations. The
same intuition applies in my setting. If an agent knows that his counterparty has already
entered a contract (but has not hit the position limit), he will not follow the planner’s
recommendation to enter an additional contract with him.
24Another assumption is that upon observing an out-of-equilibrium event, an agent updates his beliefs
about his counterparty’s past actions but continues to believe that all other agents in the current trading
round have just showed up for trade and will follow their equilibrium strategies (to enter one contract and
leave). Thus, an agent assigns a zero probability to the event that in the next round he will be matched
with an agent from a previous round. The assumption is analogous to the notion of passive beliefs (McAfee
and Schwartz, 1994), which is common in the contract theory literature.
25Bester and Strausz (2000, 2001) also analyze a situation in which agents send messages directly to the
principal without using a noisy device. They show that if there is only one agent, the principal can restrict
attention to a direct mechanism in which (i) the agent’s message space is the set of his types, and (ii) it
is an optimal strategy for the agent to report his true type with a positive probability. However, when the
principal deals with more than two agents, the message space may need to include more messages than types.
Intuitively, the principal can add noise — just like a noisy device does — by implementing an equilibrium in
which an agent sometimes lies, or by including more messages than types.
154.5 The planner as a clearinghouse
The central planner can be interpreted as an intermediary who sets position limits and
lets a pair of agents register their contract, as long as none of them have reached the limit.
The closest real-world example is a clearinghouse, as discussed in the introduction.
The results (including nonbinding position limits) remain even if, in addition to the
minimal role above, the intermediary becomes a central counterparty that guarantees pay-
ments. Since default never happens in equilibrium, the intermediary does not need to have
any capital to make this guarantee credible. In the out-of-equilibrium event in which an
agent enters more than one contract and defaults, the intermediary defaults as well. The
intermediary can prevent this type of default by setting aside some capital, but this is not
necessary in our model.26
5. What if Agents Cannot Send Reports to a Central Plan-
ner?
In the analysis above, I showed that the second best can be achieved if agents can send
reports to a central planner. Below I show that the ability to send reports is crucial: If
agents cannot send reports to a central planner (e.g., if there is no clearinghouse), the second
best cannot be achieved.
To see why, suppose agents are unable to send reports to the central planner, and
suppose, by contradiction, that there is an equilibrium in which every agent enters the
second-best contract exactly once and follows it.27 The only belief consistent with the
equilibrium path is that all the agents who are present in the current round have just
showed up for trade. Given this belief, an agent expects that each of his counterparties
will enter one contract and deliver on it. A necessary condition is that if all other agents
follow their equilibrium strategies, an agent cannot gain by entering more than one contract.
However, the second-best contract does not satisfy this condition, as follows: If  ≥ 1+1
2,
the second-best contract does not require collateral and a deviating agent can enter ∗ +1
contracts, thereby obtaining more than what he obtains if he enters only one contract. If
 ≤ 1+1
2, the second-best contract requires collateral. Since   1
2 (by simple algebra),
a deviating agent can enter at least two contracts and obtain (2)  ().T h u s ,i ti s
optimal to deviate.
Can agents beneﬁt from bilateral trade? Yes. However, rather than relying on position
limits, agents must rely on collateral to limit the number of contracts that a deviating
agent can enter. If the collateral is  (per contract), a deviating agent can enter at most 1

contracts, since he has only one dollar to begin with.
26If the intermediary sets aside some capital, Proposition 4 no longer holds, since an agent is guaranteed
to obtain what is promised to him, even if his counterparty defaults. However, Proposition 4 continues to
hold if a large group of agents can collude. Suppose these agents learn that their counterparties have already
entered contracts, and suppose these agents share this information among themselves. Then the agents may
rationally expect that the capital set by the clearinghouse may not be enough to guarantee payments to all
of them.
27I restrict attention to symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which agents of the same type follow
the same (pure) strategy. I also assume that strategies do not depend on the index of the trading round in
which an agent is present; this can be motivated by assuming that an agent does not know in what round
he showed up.
16Formally, denote by () the utility for an agent of type  who enters  ≤ 1

contracts, planning to default on all of them, if each of his counterparties delivers. Similar




(− − ).( 1 2 )
Thus, the equilibrium contract must satisfy () ≥ (),f o r ∈ {12} and for every
integer  ≤ 1






( − 1)(− − ) ≤ ( − 1),( 1 3 )
for  ∈ {12} and for every integer  ≤ 1
. In the special case  =1 , (13) reduces to (8).
The extra term when   1 is the expected net payoﬀ from entering additional contracts
and not delivering on them: In one state the agent collects payments from each of his
additional counterparties; in the other state the agent loses his collateral.
The optimal agreement (and related contract) when agents cannot communicate with
a central planner is referred to as third best. The third-best problem is to ﬁnd a feasible
agreement that maximizes 1 + 2, subject to the participation constraint, (5), and the
incentive constraint, (13). To ensure that a solution exists, I drop the restriction that 
be an integer; the appendix contains a micro foundation for this.28 The optimal agreement
is obtained by setting  = 1
 and solving (2), (4), and (13) with equalities. The next
proposition characterizes the unique solution.
Proposition 5. (Third best) The optimal agreement when agents cannot send reports to
a central planner involves collateral, and more than in the second best. The agreement is








,  =  − 1,a n d =2+ +2 .
Under the third-best agreement, an agent promises more than the amount of cash that
h ep o s t sa sc o l l a t e r a l ,i . e . , .S p e c i ﬁcally, it follows from Equation (13) that  =
+
2(−1)
 ,w h e r e = 1
.T h eﬁrst term () captures the idea that an agent cannot default
on the amount of cash that he posts as collateral. The second term captures the idea that
requiring collateral limits the number of contracts that an agent can enter, and this makes
the threat of losing future cash ﬂows valuable in backing promises.
As in the second best, the optimal amount of collateral decreases in  but increases in
. The proof in the appendix applies to a more general case in which entering a contract
involves some ﬁxed cost , which can represent the time and eﬀort involved in entering a
contract. I show that when  falls, the third-best agreement requires more collateral. A
lower  represents a more liquid market. Liquid markets present a problem in this model
because they create more opportunities for strategic default.29 The following conclusion
then follows:
28If  is restricted to be an integer, a solution may not exist because the set of feasible agreements that
satisfy Equation (13) may be open (since  is not a continuous function of ).
29In an appendix available upon request, I focus on another feature of a liquid market: the probability of
not ﬁnding a counterparty. The eﬀects of reducing this probability are similar to the eﬀects of reducing the
ﬁxed cost per trade.
17Corollary 2. The gain from allowing agents to send reports to a central planner increases
when the ﬁxed cost per trade () falls.
6. Robustness
6.1 What if agents can choose the contract terms?
In the analysis above I assumed that the contract is set by the central planner. The
main result remains even if a pair of agents can choose to enter a contract that is diﬀerent
from the one suggested by the central planner. To see why, suppose a side planner suggests
that a pair of agents enter  6=  without reporting. The two agents save the reporting
cost, but to prevent default they must post more collateral than in the second best. If the
cost of sending a report to the central planner is suﬃciently low, the extra cost of collateral
outweighs the beneﬁts of not reporting.
Proposition 5 (third best) also remains. In fact, the third-best agreement is the only
feasible agreement satisfying Equations (5) and (13) (participation and incentive) that is
both symmetric and renegotiation proof.30
6.2 Unobservable endowments
In the analysis above I assumed that endowments are observable. Under some conditions,
the results extend to the case in which endowments diﬀer across agents and are private
information. In particular, assume that an agent who claims having an endowment b  must
prove it by showing it to the planner. That is, an agent who has  can report b  ∈ [0].
Then agents will report their endowments truthfully and the second best will be achieved.
The extra step in which agents reports their endowments to the planner will be before
trading begins. If an agent reports b , his position limit will be b ∗, and the planner will
recommend that he enter the scaled contract (b b ) and invest b .T oa b s t r a c tf r o m
search and matching issues, assume that there are many trading venues and that in each
trading venue the planner recommends that agents enter a diﬀerent contract. Each agent
will select a trading venue according to the contract that he wants to enter in the given
round; the appendix contains more details.
Essentially, when endowments are observable, the planner’s role is very simple because
he only needs to rely on voluntary reports regarding the contracts that agents enter. When
endowments are private information, the planner can still rely on these voluntary reports to
learn whether a pair of agents has entered into a contractual relationship; however, to set
position limits appropriately, the planner must verify that an agent who claims to have a
certain endowment actually has it. The need to verify endowments also arises when agents
set optimal collateral levels in the decentralized environment
What if we add deep-pocket lenders to our model? Nonexclusivity rules out a situation
in which agents borrow money secretly to make their endowments look better than what
they truly are. Lenders will report all the loans they make to the planner because otherwise
30A proof is available upon request. (An agreement  is renegotiation proof if a side planner cannot
improve the agents’ utilities by giving them the opportunity to enter the agreement 
0 6=  instead of ,
such that it is optimal for each agent to follow 
0 if the other agent does, and if all other agents enter and
follow .)
18an agent could borrow from multiple lenders, divert the borrowed funds for consumption,
and subsequently default on all loans.
6.3 Multiple intermediaries
The analysis above shows that one intermediary can implement the second best, but
Proposition 2 does not rule out multiple intermediaries. For example, a position limit of four
can be implemented by four intermediaries, each setting a position limit of one.31 To see
that, adjust the trading game by assuming more than one location, such that each location
has its own intermediary (planner) who can observe only the information that is reported
to him. Each agent shows up for trade in a randomly chosen location. Initially, an agent
must trade in the location where he shows up, but if an agent decides to stay for additional
rounds, he can switch back and forth among the diﬀerent locations. Pairwise matching
in each location is as in the original game, and an agent can communicate only with the
intermediary in the location where he is. The game above has an equilibrium in which every
agent enters one contract and reports his information truthfully to the intermediary in his
original location.
7. Conclusion
The paper constructs a mechanism that induces agents to voluntarily reveal to it all the
contracts they enter. The mechanism allows each agent to report every contract he enters,
and it reveals the names of agents who have reached some prespeciﬁed position limit. The
main result is that such a mechanism can implement the same outcome that could be
implemented if agents could not enter contracts secretly. This is true even if reporting
involves some small cost, and even if agents can collude. If agents’ endowments are private
information, the mechanism must also verify that an agent who claims to have a certain
endowment, actually has it. In general, the mechanism should not reveal the information it
has and so it cannot be replaced by a bulletin board. The paper also provides a closed-form
solution for the best outcome when agents cannot send reports to a central mechanism and
shows that the gain from allowing agents to send reports increases when markets become
more liquid.
Appendix
Unobservable Endowments. Assume that instead of one group of agents, there
are an inﬁnite number of groups corresponding to the interval (01].A g e n t s i n g r o u p
 ∈ (01] have an initial endowment .T h e r ea r ea l s oa ni n ﬁnite number of trading venues,
corresponding to the interval (01]. In trading venue  ∈ (01], the planner recommends
entering the scaled contract ( )=12 and investing ()=12. In each trading round,
the same mass of agents from each group and type shows up for trade for the ﬁrst time. An
a g e n tc a ns w i t c hb a c ka n df o r t ha m o n gd i ﬀerent trading venues.
The optimal mechanism includes an initial stage in which agents report their endow-
ments to the planner. An agent with an initial endowment  can report b  ∈ [0].I n
31More generally, 
∗ can be implemented by  intermediaries, such that intermediary  sets a position
limit  ≥ 1,a n d

=1  = 
∗.
19addition, an agent also announces the trading venue in which he chooses to trade. The
planner recommends entering a contract, and he later counts a contract as being entered,
only if the counterparty’s endowment is consistent with the trading venue.
Following a similar logic as in the single-endowment case, it is possible to show that the
second best can be implemented if the planner sets a position limit of b ∗ for an agent who
reports b . Given this position limit, an agent cannot gain by saying that he has less than
he truly has, and by assumption, he cannot say that he has more.
Dropping the Restriction That  in Equation (13) Be an Integer. Consider the
extension for unobservable endowments, and assume that an agent can trade in venue  only
if  ≥  (i.e., the agent must reveal his endowment or a portion of it to his counterparty).
When agents cannot send reports to the planner, an agent can deviate by entering multiple
contracts in the venue that corresponds to his initial endowments, but he can also trade in
venues that correspond to less than his initial endowment. Since choosing a venue 
is like entering a fraction of a contract, the number of contracts that a deviating agent can
enter is no longer restricted to be an integer.
Lemma 1. Equation (7) can be replaced with (|) ≥ (0|).
Proof. First, observe that Equation (2) must be binding; that is,  =1 −.O t h e r w i s e ,
we can increase the value of the objective function without violating the constraints by
increasing  and  by ∆ and ∆, respectively, where ∆ is small enough.
An agent can deviate by choosing 0
  . He can pay what he promised if and only if
0
 ≥ −
 . The result follows because (0
|) is linear on [0 −
 ],h a sap o s i t i v ej u m pa t
0
 = −
 , and is increasing on [−
  ] (since 1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .The proof applies to a more general case in which there
is a penalty  ≥ 0 upon default (measured in terms of utility), so (0|) is replaced
with (0|) − 1
2, and the incentive constraint becomes 1
2( − ) − 1
2 ≤ ( − 1).
When  + 1
2 ≥ 1+1
2, the second best equals the ﬁrst best. Otherwise, Equation (3)
follows from the incentive constraint, and the solution is obtained by solving the incentive
constraint and Equations (2), (4) with equalities. From (2),  =1− . Substituting this
in (4) and in the incentive constraint, and rearranging terms, we obtain: − = −(1+)
and  =  +2 (  − 1) + (3 − 2),f o r ∈ {12} Thus, 2 − 1 =( 1+)(2 − 1) and
2 − 1 =( 3− 2)(2 − 1).S i n c e2(1 − )  0  ,i tf o l l o w st h a t1+ 6=3− 2.T h u s ,
1 = 2.D e n o t i n g = ,w eo b t a i n1 = 2 =  − (1 + ) =  +2 (  − 1) + (3 − 2).
Solving for , we obtain,  =
−2(−1)−
−2(−1)+2 . Observe that ( 
)=−2(2 + )  0,a n d
(
)=2+0. Thus, the optimal amount of collateral decreases in  but increases
in . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .As explained in the text, to prevent a deviation in which
an agent enters more than one contract and defaults, we must have  ≤ ∗. To prevent
collusion, we must have  ≥ ∗.T h u s , = ∗ is a necessary condition. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .If everyone is truthful and obedient, the outcome is that
every agent enters one contract (the second best) and leaves. It is optimal to follow the
planner’s recommendations as follows: If the planner recommends that an agent agree to
20enter a contract, the agent believes that his counterparty has just showed up for trade and
will follow the contract. If the planner recommends that an agent should not agree to enter
a contract, the agent believes that his counterparty has already entered ∗ contracts and
will default if he enters an additional contract. If an agent has entered one contract, and
the planner recommends that he leave, the agent believes that his counterparty reported
him, and since ( ∗) ≤ (), it is optimal to follow the recommendation. If the
planner recommends that the agent stay, the agent believes that his (ﬁrst) counterparty
did not report, and since ( ∗ +1 ) (),i ti so p t i m a lt os t a yf o r∗ additional
rounds (and default). It is optimal to report the counterparty’s identity (truthfully) and
the fact that an agent has entered a contract because otherwise the planner acts as if the
counterparty did not enter a contract and recommends that he stay for additional rounds
and default. Collusion proofness follows from Equation (11), as explained in the text. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. The relevant case is ∗ ≥ 2. Suppose an agent learns that
his counterparty has entered  ≥ 1 contracts. Since the counterparty is expected to use
his equilibrium strategy from now on, he will either stick with the contracts he has already
entered and not agree to enter a contract in the current round, or else he will agree to enter
a contract in the current round and continue to enter as many contracts as he can, planning
to default on all contracts. In the ﬁrst case, it is suboptimal to agree to enter a contract,
since there is zero probability that the counterparty will also agree. In the second case, it is
suboptimal to enter a contract, since the counterparty will default. But then the eﬀective
position limit is less than ∗, and the implementation is not collusion proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .The proof applies to a more general case in which ()=
1+(  − 1) + 1
2(− − ) −  and ()=1+1
2(− − ) − 1
2 − .T h e
parameter  ≥ 0 represents a ﬁxed cost per trade, and  ≥ 0 represents a penalty upon
default, both measured in terms of utility. Assume that  is suﬃciently small so that the
participation constraint is satisﬁed, and the third best does not equal the second best. The
incentive constraint becomes 1
2( − −)+1
2(− − ) − ( − 1) ≤ ( − 1) + 1
2.
As in Lemma 1,  =1− . Substituting this and  = 1
 in the incentive constraint,





 − 1) −
( − 1)
P2
=1(1 − ) −  − 
P2
=1( 1
 − 1) ≤ 0. Similarly, from Equation (4) we obtain
2() ≡ 
P2
=1(1 − ) −
P2
=1( + ) ≤ 0.
Denote 0 ≡  − 2;  ≡  − 1;  ≡ 2+0 +2  + ;a n d∗ = 1
4( −
√
2 − 80).( T h e
statement of the proposition in the text is for the special case,  =  =0 .) To prove the
proposition, it is enough to show that the agreement ()=( ∗− (1 + )∗1 − ∗)
is feasible, satisﬁes the participation and the incentive constraint, and is a unique solution
to min(1 + 2) subject to () ≤ 0 for every  ∈ {12}. I prove the last part below. The
rest follows easily.
First, () ≤ 0 is binding ( =1 2), as follows: Since the second best is not achieved,
1  0 and/or 2  0. Without loss of generality, 1  0.I f1()  0 (by contradiction), we
can increase the value of the objective function without violating the constraints by replacing
1 and 1 with 1−∆ and 1+(1+)∆,w h e r e∆ is suﬃciently small. If 2()  0,w ec a n
increase the value of the objective function without violating the constraints by replacing
1 and 2 with (1 − ∆)1 and (1 − ∆)2. Hence, 1()=2()=0 .
21Denote the Lagrange multiplier of () by ,a n dl e t()=1 + 2 +
P2
=1 ().
An (optimal) solution satisﬁes 
 = 1









2 − 2 =0( =1 2). Thus, 1 = 2 ≡  and 1 = 2 ≡ .F r o m2()=0 ,w eo b t a i n
 =  − (1 + ).T h u s ,1()=0reduces to
−(1+)
 − 1=2 (1 − )+ +2 (1
 − 1).




T h es m a l l e s tr o o t( ∗) is the unique solution, since it gives a lower value for the objective
function than the other root.
It is easy to verify that ∗ ∈ (01).T os e et h a t∗  1,n o t et h a t∗  1 is equivalent to
−4
√
2 − 80.I f4, the result follows since the left-hand side is negative and the
right-hand side is positive. Otherwise, we need to show that (−4)2  2 −80,w h i c hi s
equivalent to 2 + 0. The last inequality follows from the deﬁnition of .T os e et h a t
∗  0,n o t et h a t
√
2 − 80 
√
2 = .
To do comparative statics, deﬁne  =2 2−+0. Observe that 
 |=∗ =4 ∗− =
−
√
2 − 80  0.T h u s , (∗
 )=(
 |=∗)=(1 − ∗)  0; (∗
)=
(
|=∗)=(2(−1))  0;a n d(∗
 )=(
 |=∗)=(2(−1))  0.
¥
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 .Denote the third-best agreement by  =(   ).T h e
gain from allowing agents to send reports to a central planner is () − ()=(  −
1)( − ).S i n c e  does not depend on , but  does (
  0), the gain increases
when  falls. ¥
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Figure 1. Project’s cash ﬂows for an agent of type i (i=1,2) if the agent
makes the additional investment at date 1.
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Figure 3. Sequence of events for an agent of type i. 